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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCE'S T. WIGHTMAN, 
Plain tiff and Appellant, 
YS. 
BE'TTIL \'"ON'S Inc., and SALT Case No. 9987 
LAKE CITY COR·PORATION, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT, 
BETTIL YON'S, INC. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injury resulting 
fron1 a fall on a public sidewalk. 
DISPOSfTION IN THE UOWE'R COURT 
Defendants' joint Motion for Summary Judg-
n1ent was granted by the tri·al ·court. 
NATURE 'OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
:This Responqent and Oefendant seeks to have 
the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
SITATEMENT OF FAICTS ~. 
The principal facts out of which this ac~ion 
arose haYe been recited in Plaintiff's Brief. This 
respondent agrees with plaintiff's ~tatement that 
th~ .losing party in a summary judgment action, is· 
. -~ 
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entitled to have the facts in the record reviewed in 
a light most favorable to him. However, your respon-
dent disagrees with appellant's reference, in setting 
out the facts, to "those facts outside the record on 
which 'plaintiff would rely to support the allegations 
of the complaint and which are not contradicted by 
t'he record." (Appellant's Brief p. 3) . 
The burden res'ts upon the resisting 'party to 
raise a "credible issue or s'how that he has evidence 
not then available", otherwise a summary judgment 
may be properly rendered for the moving party. 
Dupler vs. Yates, 10 U.:2d 251, 2·69, 3'51 P.2d 624. 
An unverified complaint was hel'd in that case to 
be insufficient to raise a ';'credible issue". 
The facts upon which the resisting party in-
tends to rely must appear in the record through 
"counter-affidavit or other materials". 
Thiis requirement is made more clear in Con-
tinental Bank vs. Cunningham, 10 U;2d 329, 332, 
353 P .2d 't68, by this language : 
uThe rule (56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure) permits an excursion beyond the 
'pleadings. If facts discovered in the journey 
irrefutably ~disprove facts pl~aded, summary 
judgment is appropriate on motion therefore. 
The rdle has been interpreted more articu-
late'ly by eminent auth-orities on the subject 
who suggest that the rule permits us to pierce 
the pleadings, resulting in summary judg-
ment, if an ex:amination of the facts develop-
ed under discovery procedure, by affidavit, 
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deposition, admission and the like makes it 
appear that no genuine issue of fact is pre-
senta'ble. To travel beyond that point would 
be a waste of time, energy and cost." 
The basis for this rule is salutory. When the 
res'isting party's standing in court is ·challenged 
through the summary judgment procedure, he is 
then required to place before the court those facts 
which he claims are sufficient to raise a "credible 
issue". The trial court is then properly given an 
opportunity to pass ju·dgment on the matter fully 
apprised of both positions. To permit consideration 
of statetnents on appeal which ·have no foundation 
in 'the record, would open the flood gates to extra-
aneous unfounded claims and prevent the effective 
use of the summary judgment procedure. 
Therefore, it is res·pectful'ly su·bmitted that 
volunteered allegations in Appellant's ~statements 
of Facts, as to wh!a't might be proved, or reference 
to facts or claims which do not appear in the record, 
are improper and should be stricken and ·disre-
garded. 
Accordingly, references in Appellant's Brief 
concerning defendant's "total neglect" of its proper-
ty, (Appel1ant's Brief p. 4); the nature of. tr.affic 
at Zenith A venue and Highland Drive, and the pos-
sible affect 'thereof (Appellant'1s Brief pp. 5.:.6); the 
Beefeater's parking lot and parking lot traffic, and 
other references as to what the plaintiff "would 
show" are not properly before this court. 
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Further reference to the record will be made 
in connection with respondent's argument. 
STATE ME NT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RIDLING 
"'"L\.S A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT, 
BETTILYON'S, INC., HAD NO D'UTY TO ELIMINATE 
OR PREVENT THE NATURAL GROWT·H O·F WEEDS 
OVER PORTIONS OF THE PU·BLIC SIDEWALK. 
·POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED 
TO SHIFT HER 'THEORY OF RECOVERY TO INCLUDE 
AN ACTION IN NUISANCE, W·HERE THE SAME IS 
RA:ISED FOR THE FIRST TrME ON APPEAL. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL C·O·URT DID N·OT ERR IN FINDING 
PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENT AS A 
MATTER OF 'LAW. 
\POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTiiFF ASSUME·D ·THE 
RISK. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COUR'T 'DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
AS A MATTER O·F LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT, 
BETTILYON'S, INC., HAD NO D'UTY TO ELI1MINATE 
O·R PREVENT THE NATURAL GROWTH ·oF WEEDS 
OVER PO'RTI'ONS OF THE PU'BLI'C SIDEWALK. 
It is an elementary ~and long standing principle 
of the common law, that an a'djoining or abutting 
landowner has no :affirmative duty to control natur-
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al g-ro\vth upon his property. The case of Giles vs. 
ll"alkc,-, ~-l Q.B. D'iv. 656 (England, 1890), de-
clares the comtnon law with reference to this mat-
ter. There the plaintiff brought an action for failure 
of the defendant to control thistles, which grew upon 
his land following cultivation and later disuse. The 
thistles seeded in large numbers and blew onto the 
plaintiff's land and caused great damage. The plain-
tiff contended that if the lan~d ha'd been left in its 
nattu·a:l state, the thistles would not have grown, but 
by bringing the land into cultivation it caused the 
thistles to grow and hence the damage to his proper-
ty. The court stated: 
"There can be no duty between adjoin-
ing occupiers to control the thistles wh'ich are 
the natural growth of the soil." 
This principle has been recognized and followe·d 
in .. A.merica. In the case of Michalson v. Nutting, 175 
N.E. 490 (Mass. 1931), the plaintiff brought an 
action in equity alleging that roots from a popl~ar 
tree growing upon the land of the defendants ha'd 
penetrated plaintiff's land, filled up sewer and 
drain lines, and catlsed damage to h'is basement 
and foundation walls. 
The trial court's action dismissing the action 
\\·as sustained on appeal in this language: 
"There is no error. We see no distinction 
between damage done by shade, and damage 
caused by overhanging branches or invading 
roots. 
;_) 
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"·The neighbor, though without right of 
appeal to the courts _if harm results ~o ~im, 
is nevertheless, not Without remedy. H1s right 
to cut off the intruding boughs or roots is 
well recognized. (Citing cases) . '' 
In the present case the city had the right, if 
not the ·duty, to cut offending weeds, but apparently 
declined to do so even after ndtice. 
The Restatement of Torts, Section 363, rec-
ognizes this principle: 
"Neither a possessor of land nor a lessor 
... is subject to liability for bodily harm 
cause'd to other~s outside the land by a natural 
condition of the land other than trees grow-
ing near a highway.' 
Although some text book writers have suggest-
ed a contrary result (Appellant's Brief, p. 19), no 
specific reference is made to weeds and no case law 
is referred to which would be helpful here. 
Under the provi,s'ions of ·section 68-3-1, Utah 
Code Annotated (195'3), Utah is committed to fol-
low the common law. 
HiThe common }law of England, so far as 
it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, 
the constitution or laws of the United States, 
or 
1the Constitution or laws of this state, and 
so far on'ly as it i,s consistent with and adapted 
to the natural ~an'd physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people hereof, 
is hereby adopted and shall be the rule of deci-
sion in all courts of thi·s state." 
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There was at the time of this accident, August 
22, 1962, no statute or ordinance impressing upon 
a property owner the responsibility of controlling 
Wt\t~d~, except as contained in Section 15-1-7, Re-
,~ised Ordinances of Salt Lake City (1955). That 
chapter deals with fire prevention and prohibits a 
property owner from permitting weeds or combus-
tible vegetation to grow within ten feet of ~any 
building or other structure which itself is composed 
of cotnbustible materials. Obviously, this provision 
has no application in this case, nor is there any evi-
dence that that ord1nance was violate~d. 
The plaintiff cites Section 10-8-23, Utah Code 
l-\.nnotated 1'953, ( Appell'ant's Brief, p. 23), as im-
posing a duty upon Bettilyon's to remove weeds from 
the public sidewalk. However, that statute merely 
provides that Cities "may regulate and control the 
use of sidewalks . . . and they may require the owner 
or occupant ... to remove all weeds ... " (Emphasis 
added). The statute is only a delegation of authority 
to the cities, if they choose to exercise it. Section 
10-8-24, U.C.A., 1953, is a similar delegation of 
power to cities which must be implemented by ordin-
ance. In any event, it has no application to the·con-
trol of weeds by an abutting property owner. The 
statute reads as follows: 
"They may regulate and prevent the 
throwing or depositing of ashes, offal, dirt, 
garbage or any offensive m,atter in, and pre-
vent injury or obstruction to, any street, side-
walk, avenue, alley, park or public ground." 
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Section 38-1-8, Revised Ordinances of S~alt Lake 
City, is also cited by the plaintiff as being an in-
junction again'St permitting weed growth by a land-
owner. The section enjoins an owner of property 
from placing or permitting upon the sidewalk: 
''. . . ( 2) any wagons, I umber, wood, 
boxes, fencing, building materials, dead trees, 
tree stumps, merchandise or other th'ing 
which shall obstruct such public side street or 
sidewalk or other part thereof or the free use 
and enjoyment thereof, or the free passage 
over and upon the same, or any part thereof, 
without the permission of the Board of Com-
missioners." 
'This Ordinance can find no application in the 
facts of this case. Weeds or natural growth is not 
mentioned. In addition, under the well known prin-
ciple of construction ejusdem generis, the phrases 
"or other like substances" and "other things", re-
stricts the Ordinance in ope~ation. ''When general 
words or terms follow specific one<S, the general 
must be understood as applying to things of the kind 
as the specific." W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 3 Ut. '2d 7, 27'7 P.·2d 809, 81'2. The 
items enumerated in the Ordinance have to do with 
affirmative acts of the owner or adjacent premises 
in o'bstructing the sidewalk with objects which are 
apart from, or severed from the ground, and does 
not impose any obligation upon such an owner to 
control natural growth. 
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It was not until July 30, 1963, nearly a year 
following the accident, when Salt Lake City acted 
under its legislative mandate by requiring lan·d-
owners to control growth of weeds on their property: 
Section 18-15-1 and 2, Revised, Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City provides: 
''Real property to be kept clean. It shall 
be unlawful for any person owning or occupy-
ing any real property in Salt Lake City to 
fail to contro'l the growth of injurious and 
noxiotls weeds on such property, or to fail to 
remove from such property any and such 
weeds or any garbage, refuse and any un-
sightly or de1eterious objects or structures 
upon notice from the inspector as provide~d in 
this chapter. 
* * * 
Such weeds shall be cut so as to extend no 
more than six ( 6) inches above the ground. 
After cutting, all such weeds sh~all be imme-
diately remove·d from the premises. 
The City by enacting this Ordinance, provided 
persuasive evidence that it had not previously acted 
under its authority to control the growth of weeds 
\Vi thin its limits. · 
In theory and principle the present case is simi-
lar to Berger vs. Salt Lake City, 191 P.223, 56 
Utah 403. There the court held that the City was 
not liarble for an icy condition on a sidewalk result-
ing from the natural accumulation of ice and snow. 
That decision was cited with approval in the later 
case of Hedden vs. Bingham City, 78 P.2d 637, 94 
Utah 442, wherein it was held that the town was 
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not liable for an icy condition resulting from a 
natural accumulation of ice and snow on a public 
stree't. ·The weeds in the present case were the re-
sult of natural accumulation and growth. 
·The several cases cited 'by the plaintiff as auth-
ority for imposing liability upon this defendant, are 
distinguishable from this case. In the case 
of Safeway Stores, Inc. vs. Billings, 3·53 P.2'd 63'6 
( Okl'a.), the question of defendant's negligence 
was submitted to the jury, where a pedestrian 
tripped over a tree which ·had been felled and left 
for seven or eight months, ·partially obstructing the 
sidewalk. Defendant ·hiad created the condition by 
his affirmative act. Similarly, in Concho Construc-
tion Co. vs. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., !201 F.2d 
673 (lOth Cir., 1953) the defen~dant had placed an 
unmarked underground gas riser on the gas com-
pany's pipeline right-of-way. Negligence was a jury 
question. Again, the condition was created by the 
landowner's :affirmative act. 
In Salt Lake City vs. Schubach, 108 Utah 2'66, 
159 P.2d 149, a pedestrian trippe'd over a defective 
condition in the sidewalk, which had been caused 
by the faulty installation of a sidewalk chute. ;This 
court discussed lialb'ility in 'terms of ''creating or 
continuing nuisance". Again, owner lial1ility was 
predicated upon his affirmative act. 
Also, the case of Updegraff vs. City of Norman 
('Okla., 1955) 287 P;2d 909, involved a landowner's 
10 
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hedge which encroached upon a public alley. It was 
the affirmative act which was condemned by the 
court. 
In the case of Baysinger vs. Standard Furni-
ture Co., 220 P.2d 117, 11'8 Utah'121, which was an 
action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff 
in stumbling over a ledge in a driveway across a 
sidewalk, the court in affirming a non-suit in favor 
of the albutting owners, stated: 
"Before the appe'llant i,s enti'tled to have 
the jury consider this question, however, it 
is first necessary that some duty, o'bliga;tion 
or negligence on the part of respondents, or 
either of them, be established rendering 'them 
liable for the injury sustained by appellant." 
* * * 
"There exists no obligation on the part 
of an :abutter to keep the sidewalk adjoining 
his premises in repair, nor is he liable for any 
state of disrepair. His obligation can only 
arise where he creates through use or other 
wise, some unsafe or dangerous condition. See 
Daly vs. Mathews, 4'9 Cal. App. 2'd 545, 12'2 
P. 2·d 81." ( E mpha'Sis added) . 
The duty of an abutting owner is framed in 
terms of an. affirmative act in bringing about. some 
unsafe or ·dangerous condition. There is no obliga-
tion on the part of an abutting property. owner· to 
keep a sidewalk in repair, nor is there any obligation 
to control the "natural growth" of weeds on his 
property wh'ich is adjacent to it .. 
11 
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The plaintiff admits that his evidence would 
not show thlat the Bettilyon's planted the weeds, nor 
that it was guilty of any active negligence (Appel-
lant's Brief p. 60). He nevertheless ~argues that there 
is no evidence that the weeds were not artificially 
created. In response, we cite the Giles ·decision, which 
indicated that thistles whose growth was ai'ded 
by the cultivation of land, was considered a natural 
growth. Further, Webster's New Collegiate Dic-
tionary, 2nd Edition, defines a weed as l"wild growth 
... any ·plant growing in cultivated ground to 'the 
detriment of the crop, or to the disfigurement of 
the place; and economically useless or unsightly." 
The term is so common as to be understan'dable in 
common parlance and is a matter concerning which 
this court may take judicial notice. Section 78-25-1, 
(U.C.A., 1'953). 
The rule of decision which should be applied in 
this case, is the common law as stated in the Giles 
case. The laws of this state, at the time of this acci-
dent, did not impose upon an abutting owner any 
duty to control the natural growth of weeds upon 
his property. 
·POINT I'I. 
THE PIJAINTIFF S'H10 1ULD NOT BE PE:RMITTED 
TO SH'I'FT HE·R 'THEORY OF REC·OVERY 'TO INCLUDE 
AN ACTION IN NUISANCE, WHERE THE SA'ME IS 
RAISED FOR THE 'FIRST TIME ·ON A·PPEAL. 
The plaintiff in her 'brief (p. ·2'5 et seq.), seeks 
to have the weeds declared a nuisance and for the 
' 
12 
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first timP interjects this issue into this case. Her 
com plaint seeks recovery for negligence ( R. 1). The 
pretrial order sounds only in negligence ( R. 7). The 
tern1 nuisance does not even appear. The plaintiff 
tnay not for the first time on appeal raise a new 
theory of recovery, where it goes beyond the plead-
ings of the case. 
As a corollary to the well recognized rule that 
errors not raised below will not ordinarily be con-
sidered on appea:l, is the rule that the reviewing court 
will consider the case only upon the theory upon 
which it was tried in the court below. Thus, in the 
case of Pettingill vs. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 269, 
272 P.2d 185, the plaintiff's father instituted an 
action ag·ainst the defendant motorist for the death 
of his 26 month old boy, who was killed when struck 
by the defen~dant's :autom·obile while the boy was 
crossing a street as his mother was working a jig-
saw puzzle in front of their home. From an adverse 
ruling the father appealed. IThe case was tried upon 
the theory of the plaintiff :and the jury was instru~t­
ed and returned a verdict based thereon. 'On appeal 
.the plaintiff attempted to change his theory of the 
case. The attempt was denie·d. 
uGenerally, appellate courts will not. re-
Yiew a ground of objection not urged in the 
trial court. 3 Am. Jur. 116, Appeal and Error, 
381. The duty is incumbent upon counsel to 
give the trial court the opportunity to correct 
the error before asking the appellate court 
to re,·erse a verdict and judgment thereon 
13 
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... To permit such action 'Yould needlessly 
prolong litigation, so there m1ght never be :an 
end thereto. Having by his own pleadings, 
evidence, and instruction tried and rested the 
case upon the theory that the mother's negli-
gence would bar the father, he is bound there-
by, as the law of the case. He cannot now on 
appeal, shift his theory and position. (Citing 
cases)." 
See also Steele vs. Wilkinson, 10 Utah 2d 159, 
162, 349 P.2d 1117. 
In any event, ·Section 78-·38-1, U. C.A. ( 19'53) , 
is not applicable to the fac·ts of this case. This sta-
tute has to do primarily with matters which are 
"injurious to the health or in·decent, or offensive 
to the senses or an obstruction to the free use of 
property ... "Again the doctrine of ejusdem generis 
would restrict the language to it~ms similar to those 
specificially enumerated and preclude its application 
in the instant case. 
The case of Dall vs. Utah Oil R.ejining Co., 
71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269, cited in support of her claim 
of nuisance, is· not in ·point, since it had to do with 
gases, odors and fumes emitted from the defendant, 
Utah Oil Refining 1Company's plant. Even though 
there was undisputed testimony of odors, inconveni-
ence· ·and other .annoyance, the court in ruling for 
the ·defen~dant, stated that i't is not every discomfort 
or annoyance which is compensable in the courts of 
equity. 'The case did not involve encroachment 
through natural growth. 
14 
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In the ca~P of (lannon 1'S. N e lvberger, 1 U .2d 
;)~Hi, a99, 268 P.2d 42f), the plaintiff brougHt :an 
action to abate a claimed nuisance in the form of 
three Carolina Poplar trees and two Siberian Elm 
trees which defendants had upon their property. Al-
though the court ordered the poplar trees "topped", 
this pertinent observation was made by the Court: 
"To hold trees to be a nuisance subject 
to abatement and equity, or subject to actions 
at law for damages, merely 'because leaves or 
twigs or other branches in the ordinary course 
of affairs may ·be blown from them onto the 
neigh·bors lots, would be to con·demn to aboli-
tion all shade trees in communities suffi-
ciently ·settled to h:ave perils of such experi-
ences. It wot1ld thus require only a short time 
until the prevalence of trees in this state 
would he reduced to the 'lone cedar' which the 
pioneers found upon their entrance into Salt 
Lake Valley, and our com·munities would re-
vert to blistering, windswept desert. Neither 
law nor equity could encourage, much less con-
tribute to, such a condition." 
The court referred to the plaintiff's common 
law right to "cut off offending roots and 'branches". 
The same privilege is accorded the defendant city 
under the facts of the instant case. There is no law 
which would restrict the defendant City from main-
taining its own sidewalks by cutting, or otherwise 
eliminating, weeds or growth along the edges of the 
sidewalk. This is a common law right which every 
adjacent property owner has. 
15 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL CO·U·RT DID NOT ER'R IN FINDING 
PLAINTIFF CONTRIB'UTORY NEGLIGENT AS A 
1\iATTER OF LAW. 
The court ruled that the plaintiff was contri-
butorily negligent as a mater of law, which proxi-
mately contributed to her in'jury an·d damage, in 
that she permitted her foot to become entangled in 
the weeds and faile'd to take a safe and convenient 
route around them. 
There is no question concerning plaintiff's 
knowledge of the presence and the condition of the 
weeds. She had lived near them :and used the side-
walk on many occasions (Plaintiff's Deposition 
p. 4). She had ''messed two or three dresses with the 
sticky tops of the weeds", and because of their 
condition an,d presence, had taken another route 
which was :across the street (Plaintiff's Deposition 
p. 5) . She had also ca~lled the city about the con'dition 
of the weeds and the sidewalk, but did not notify 
Bettilyon's 1 CPlaintiff's Deposition pp. 5, 18). She 
had passed that way previously several times even 
though she wa~ aware of the weeds and their ·.in-
~onveniertce and annoyance. On the day of the acci-
dent, she·· experienced .no diffic11lty in seeing the 
.sidewalk, nor 'did she hesitate to walk down the path 
:between the weeds which had grown upon either 
side. (Plaintiff's Deposition p. 16). While returning 
from the s'tore she met a neighbor and they began 
their wa:lk 'home together ('Plaintiff's Depos!tion 
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p. 17) . i. \s they approached the portion of the side-
walk where weeds were growing, she commented: 
h llere is \vhere \Ve single file". (Plaintiff's Deposi-
tion p. 17). She proceeded her neighbor as they 
\valked down the path. Her foot became entangled 
in weeds to the side of the path, and S1he fell. 
She had previously viewed the area and was 
acquainted with it. (Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 5, 8, 
16). She had gone around the area on previous occa-
sions (Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 5, 16). She had ob-
ser,~ed it in sufficient detail to be concerned about 
it and to inform the ci'ty an·d ask them to correct it, 
(Plaintiff's Deposition p. 5). Even as she walked 
through the path the area was lighted by a street 
lamp. It was not extremely dark, but as she in'dic-
ated it was past twi'light (Plaintiff's !Deposition 
p. 9). She had traversed the same route just a few 
minutes previous to the time of the injury (Deposi-
tion 20, 21) . 
. ~lthough the plaintiff di·d not see the precise 
\veed which caused her to catch :her foot, on the basis 
of her admitted ·prior knowledge and conduct with 
respect to the weeds, she is charged with knowledge 
concerning their potential hazard. There was a safe 
path along the sidewalk. This fact is made clear by 
her own admission. Prudent conduct would have 
taken her safely by the place of her injury. 
In addition, plaintiff had a clear alternative 
route which was convenient and without hazard. 
17 
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She had utilized it on prior occasions. She needed 
only to cross the street and walk down the sidewalk 
on the opposite side. This route was readily avail-
able to her. 
The right to have a jury pass upon a'll questions 
of fact is not an absolute right. 
In the case of Wold vs. Ogden City, 123 Ut. 
270, 258 P.:2d 4·53, 4'55, the Court quoting language 
of the former Chief Justice Woolf, stated: 
"It hias been strenuously argued by plain-
tiff that this decision has deprived him of his 
constitutional right to a jury trial. That con-
tention h'as been urged upon this court in 
almost every case of nonsuit and 'directed 
verdict brought 'before us. This Court is 
charged· wi'th the duty of protecting all of the 
righ'ts of all litigants. 'This is especially true 
of those fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the 'State an·d Federal Constitutions. But the 
right 'to have a jury pass upon issues of fact 
does not include the right to have a cause sub-
mitted to a jury in the hope of a verdict where 
the:·· facts undisputably show th:at the plain-
tiff is not entitled to relief." 
.;.. ·In theW old·case, the plaintiff was injured while 
attempting to cross in darkness, a trench approxi-
mately 4 feet deep and '2% feet· wide, which was 
in front ~f his property. ·In~' ·his .effort· one of the 
banks of· the trench gave w~y under his foot, re-
sulting~ 'in his injury. There was evidence that the 
const.r.uction:.~ompany h·ad been requested to repair 
18 
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a safe place of crossing and that others had jumped 
across the trench on a num~ber of occasions. The al-
terna ti \"e was to travel 11~ block to cross the street. 
The plaintiff exposed himself to this known danger 
in order to exercise a right and privilege which he 
had to use the streets. In this regard the court ob-
served: 
" 'But such right and privilege are not 
without limitation and certainly cannot in-
clude the prerogative of use without the exer-
cise of due care. It would seem that a reason-
able, prudent person would not expose him-
self to a known danger when there is an easy, 
known and convenient route about it!" (p. 
456) 
A dismissal of the plaintiff's action was sustained. 
So, in this case, the plaintiff had previously 
shown concern for the weeds in walking around them 
and in realizing that it was necesS'ary to pass by 
them in single file. If she could not clearly see them, 
she had a safe alternative route availa'ble. If she 
could see clearly, reasonable conduct would have 
taken her safetly by. A prudent person would know 
that walking 'into the weeds would result in diffi-
culty. Certainly the danger was open and obvious to 
her. 
The case of Rodrigu,ez vs. City of Los Angeles, 
341 P.2d 410 (California), cited by the appellant 
(Appellant's Biref p. ~go), is similar only in that a 
plaintiff fell by stepping on a plant which was per-
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mitted to grow in direct violation of a City Ordin-
ance, and caused ·him to fall into a pronged fence, 
which was also located in violation of law, and re-
sulted in the loss of hi'S eye. However, there was no 
indication that the plaintiff had any prior knowl-
edge of the dangerous condition, or that he was ever 
alerted, by reason of prior ·acquaintance or use, that 
added caution was necessary in passing by the area 
in question. 
Jackson vs. Southwestern Public Service Com-
pany, 349 P.2d 1029, a New Mexico case, is not 
helpful. There a plaintiff was injure'd while at-
tempting to cross a street on crutches. A different 
standard of care is involved for one who is physic-
ally limited than one who is not. The Court speci-
fically stated ·th:at there was no evidence presented 
in the record to indicate whether or not the plain-
iff's use of his crutches was improper or unsafe. 
The plaintiff in McLaughlin vs. City of Los 
Angeles, 140 P. 2d 416 (Cal), who was walking 
.along side of a dirt road in an area of safety, was 
required by the presence of a parked automobile, 
to leave his path and take a more dangerous route 
into a roa'd filled with holes. He was pressed into 
·a situation from which there was no realistic a1ltern-
ative. In addition, he h·ad no prior knowledge of the 
hazard because the parked automobile created an 
entirely· n~ew situation which he faced for the first 
time~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, it is not necessary to resort to deci-
sions bPyond the State of Utah for a solution of the 
present problem. The plaintiff admits that her 
knowledge of the existence of the weeds increased 
her standard of care and required her to proceed 
with greater caution than would have otherwise 
bePn the case (Plaintiff's Brief p. 35). 
This court has not been hesitant in the past to 
direct a verdict against liability on finding contri-
butory negligence under facts similar to the one 
before the bar. 
In the case of Eisener vs. Salt Lake City, 238 
P.2d 416, 417, 120 Ut. 6'7'5, plaintiff was injured 
from a fall on a defective sidewalk. The Court con-
cluded that she was negligent as a matter of law. 
At the point of the injury a slab of cement 6' x 8' 
had been removed for the purpose of installing a 
sewer for ·an adjacent business house, an'd the City 
had also excavated to install a water meter. The 
soil had settled, leaving an irregular ·depression of 
~bout 8 inches at the deepest place, and the defect 
had existed for over a year. 
The plaintiff lived near the area and passed 
it frequently and was aware of its potential danger. 
During daylight hours, as S"he passed in the vicinity, 
a group of children momentarily distracted her at-
tention and she fell into the depression an'd suffered 
injury. In sustaining the trial court's directed ver-
dict the Court used this language : 
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"That the degree of care which one must 
exercise for his own safety is a matter for 
the jury generally is true, but the iauthorities 
seem to hold tha:t a pedestrian with prior 
knowledge of a sidewalk defect and an unob-
structed daylight view who steps into a visible 
defect is contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law, such action fal'ling s-hort of stan~dards 
attributable to the reasonable prud'en't man." 
While it is true that this plaintiff ·did not have, 
at the time of her fall, an unobstructed daylight 
view, she had on many previous occasions viewed 
the area in the daylight and :at the time of her injury 
the area w~as readily visible because it was not yet 
fully dark and a street light was located nearby. 
She does not contend that she forgot the presence 
of the weeds. Even so, momentarily forgetfulness 
of the defect would not have excused her. She re-
membere'd their presence and cautioned her travel-
ing companion to pass the ·area in single file. 
As was stated in the Eisener case, "if she looked 
s·he must have seen it and deli'berately stepped into 
it, and if she did not look then she neglected her 
duty ... In either event she cannot recover." 
The principles announced in -the Eisener case 
are reaffirmed in Cole vs. Kloepfer, . 12'3 ·Utah 4'52, 
2'6-0 P.2d 51'8. There this Court sustained a directed 
verdict for personal injuries caused by a defective 
sidewalk. The pl:aintiff was aware of the sidewalk 
con·dition by reason of her previous use of the area. 
Durin·g the late afternoon while p\laintiff was mo-
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rnentarily distracted by a passing automobile, she 
stubbed h£'r toe on the abutting pavement, fell and 
suffered injury. A momentary distraction did not 
excuse the plaintiff from observing what she ought 
to have seen. 
The plaintiff in the present case cannot ·point 
to any distraction which would have directed her 
attention from her path. There is nothing to in-
dicate in either the Cole or the Eisener cases that 
the plaintiffs were aware of the precise stone or ir-
regular defect in the sidewalk which caused either 
of them to fall. They were only generally aware of 
the unsafe nature of the ·area. So too, in the instant 
case, the plaintiff, while not being aware of the 
specific weeds in which her foot became entangled, 
was aware of the hazard of the area. Through in-
attention she permitted herself to become en'tangled 
in the weeds. So too, the plain~tiffs in the Cole and 
Eisener case permitted themselves to stumble or 
fall over a specific object within the known dan-
gerous condition itself. 'The fact that the accidents 
in the Cole and Eisener cases occurred 'during day-
light hours does not make the application of the 
principles announced therein inapplicable in this 
case, for although it was late evening the :area was 
lighted and ·a safe pathway was clearly observable 
ahead. 
The case of H~tnt vs. Tooele City, 8 Utah 2d 323, 
334 P.2d 5'58, is not applica:ble ·because the plaintiff 
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there had no prior knowledge of the dangerous con-
dition or defect which resulted in her fall. 
Under all the circumstances the plaintiff's con-
duct in permitting her foot to 'become entangled, is 
such a devi~ation from prulden!t conduct as to make 
it contributory negligence as a ma'tter of law. 
POINT IV. 
THE COIURT DID NOT ERR IN RULIN·G AS A 
MATTER OF LAW TH'AT PLAINTIFF ASSU'ME:D 'THE 
RISK. 
This Court has frequently set forth those cir-
cumstances under which the assumption of risk doc-
trine is applicable as a defense. In the case of John-
son vs. M~aynard, 9 U'tah 2·d 268, 342 P.2d 884, 887, 
the court s'ta ted : 
"The fundamental consideration under-
lying it (ass urn ption of risk) is th1at one 
should not be permitted to know lingly and vol-
untarily incur an obvious risk of personal 
harm when he has the ability to avoid doing 
so, and then hold another re8ponsible for his 
injury. Its essential elements .are knowledge 
of a ·danger and a free and voluntary consent 
to assume it." Citing Clay v. Dunford, 121 
Utah 177, 23'9 P.2d1075. 
The doctrine was foun·d applicable in Wold vs. 
Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d 453, because 
the plaintiff had exposed himself to a known danger 
when there was an easy known and convenient route 
around it. 
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So in the present case, plaintiff was aware of 
a convenient route about the area of weeds into 
which she fell. She could have utilized it by merely 
crossing 'the street and walking down the other side 
on the sidewalk. Her previous concern for the weeds 
indicated that she was aware of the danger which 
\vhich lurked on either side of the sidewalk. The 
altern·a;tive route was both convenient and reason-
able. If she were willing to choose the a'l'ternative 
route to prevent a few burrs from attaching to her 
dress, it would not seem an unreasonable burden 
for her to take the same route where her own safety 
was concerned. 
Although the plaintiff talks of exposing her-
self to greater dangers by crossing the street, ( Ap-
pellant's Brief p. 434), there is no reference to this 
in the record, and this portion of the argum,ent 
should be disregarded in accordance with the prin-
ciples previously discussed. 
To restrict the application of the ·doctrine to 
those instances where the plaintiff was ·aware of the 
precise agency which resul,ted in injury, is not sup-
ported by Utah cases, nor does reason justify it. 
If a litigant attempts to cross a body of water which 
he knows to be covered by a very thin s·heet of ice, 
which could well break un'der his weight, it would 
not seem necessary for him to predict precisely where 
the ice would break in order that the doctrine of 
assumption of risk be applicable, but only that it 
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would break. Similarly, in the Wold case, it was not 
a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine, for 
the plaintiff to predict exactly how the bank would 
cave or the precise manner in which he would be 
injured. It was sufficient that he expose'd himself 
to a known danger. Likewise, in the in,stant case, 
it is not necessary that the plaintiff see, or be aware 
of the precise weed, which would entangle her foot, 
it is on'ly necessary that she be 1aware tha't ·danger 
was lurking in the weeds which grew along either 
side of the sidewalk, and that she knowingly exposed 
herself to the danger. Particularly is this so where 
there was an ~admitted "easy, known and convenient 
route about it." 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that this respondent, Bettilyons' 
Inc., as an abutter to the public sidewalk, had no 
duty, either statutory or common law, to control the 
natural growth of wee'ds which encroached upon the 
sidewalk, and plain'tiff should not be permiltted to 
shift his 'theory of r~ecovery 'to include nuisance, hav-
ing raised it for the first time on appeal. 
Under the circumstances the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence in permitting her 
foot to become entangled in 'the weeds adjacent to 
the sidewalk when ·a clear path existe'd through 
them, or in failing to take a known convenient route 
around them. Further, she knowingly exposed her-
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self to a danger and did not utilize a easy, known 
and convenient route about it. 
Respectfully su,bmitte'd, 
HANSON & BALWDIN and 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent, Bettilyon's fmc. 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The un·dersigned hereby certifies that he served 
the within Brief upon Plaintiff and Appellant by 
miailing three ( 3) copies of the same to her at-
torneys Skeen, Worsley, Snow & Christensen, a't 701 
Continental Ban'k 'Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and upon Respondent Salt Lake City Corporation 
by mailing three ( 3) copies of the S'ame to its at-
torney, A. M. Mardsen, 414 City & County Build-
ing, 1Salt Lake City, U'tah, this ---------------- day of 
November, 1963. 
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